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 An improved audio format version of our written content. Get your defence and security perspectives now through this podcast. Politique et gouvernement Sciences politiques
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    Épisodes
    • Smuggling by Sky: The New Way Terrorists Move Supplies

      Smuggling by Sky: The New Way Terrorists Move Supplies
      Jan 23 2026
      The Houthis
      Necessity is a dark cloud that often gives birth to innovation in the turbulent arenas of contemporary conflicts. That 'dark cloud' – the existential threat – can act as a powerful catalyst for ingenuity, particularly in 21st-century conflicts. A very low-profile, yet dramatic form of this change is underway as terrorist and insurgent groups use commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – not just to conduct occasional attacks, but to provide a system of permanent, industrial-level resupply operations. This development makes fortified borders and patrolled roadways even more obsolete across the Sahel, to Yemen, and in South Asia.
      This is not a tactical gimmick. It is a strategic development. What started as experimental applications of shelf-storey drones has evolved into a stable aerial logistics chain that can transport 300-800 kilograms of explosives, electronic parts, munitions and vital materiel each week over hundreds of kilometres of enemy-controlled land.
      Terrorist groups establish their continuous logistical 'airborne' pipelines using fixed-wing UAVs, each carrying payloads of 5-20kg over distances of 100-400km per flight. These drones are now built using parts that cost less than 2500 US dollars each, with jam-resistant navigation, including SpaceX Starlink ROAM terminals, that can provide satellite-based freedom even in electronically hostile environments. These operations create long-range air bridges that evade ground interdiction and exploit vast uncontrolled airspace, unlike headline-grabbing isolated attacks.
      The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
      For instance, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has wreaked havoc across the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border region in the Sahel. ISGS uses nocturnal relay chains of short-hop drone hops to ferry ammunition and IED precursors through deserts, where the use of ground troops becomes risky due to the ambushes of French-supported forces or local militias. A 2025 report by the Institute of Security Studies states that Sahelian terrorist cells, armed with Chinese-sourced commercial quadcopters as well as fixed-wing drones, acquired via Algeria and Libya, have adapted drones with longer battery life and thermal imaging. This has maintained offensive operations in remote outposts, regardless of Wagner Group patrols. This phenomenon has contributed to the UN estimate that terrorism based in Sahel contributed to more than 40 per cent of global terrorism fatalities in the first half of 2025.
      The Houthis in Yemen
      The Houthis have also developed the infrastructure of drone logistics, turning it into a geopolitical asset in Yemen. They launch payloads more than 300 km from mountain strongholds to reach the adjacent territory, bypassing both heavily monitored land and sea borders. In October 2025, the Pentagon evaluations and U.S. naval intercepts in the Red Sea verified the shipments of dismantled drone engines and guidance kits that were delivered in parts by UAVs. Every sortie is less than a thousand dollars, and interceptor assets are over a hundred thousand dollars, continuing the Houthi campaign against Bab-el-Mandeb shipping and disabling multibillion-dollar border walls.
      Tehrik-i-Taliban in South Asia
      This trend extends to South Asia, where Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) confronts Islamabad on the Durand line. Although Pakistan has maintained fencing and towers since 2017, TTP forces in Afghanistan's Kunar and Nangarhar provinces carry out nocturnal sustainment flights of small arms, batteries and IED components directly into Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. A recent analysis by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies recorded a 30% surge in TTP attacks this year. This escalation has forced the military to divert resources to counter-drone efforts, exposing the futility of physical border barriers against overhead supply.
      Why conventional methods do not work
      These instances demonstrate that the traditional method of counter-ter...
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      8 min
    • The Future of War – When States No Longer Own The Means of War

      The Future of War – When States No Longer Own The Means of War
      Jan 21 2026
      'Power, violence and legitimacy are fragmenting, and modern conflict is starting to behave accordingly'1
      Introduction
      It's hard to shake the feeling that conflict no longer behaves the way we expect it to. Wars don't end cleanly, responsibility is always blurred, and decisions with real consequences seem to be made everywhere and nowhere at once. We sense that something has changed, but rarely have the space to stop and ask why. This isn't an attempt to predict the next war or sound the alarm. It's an effort to make sense of why power, violence and accountability no longer behave the way we assume they do, and what that could mean for states and societies that still expect to manage them.
      Modern conflict is no longer defined by the Western conception of war as a discrete event led by states, fought by armies, and concluded by treaties. It has become a fluid spectrum shaped by states, private actors, technologies, algorithms, and societies that no longer share a common centre of gravity. The result is a geopolitical environment where the means of violence are distributed, authority is conditional, and conflict increasingly persists rather than resolves. That shift is hard to miss for anyone paying even casual attention to current events.
      Conflict Without Resolution
      In Ukraine, the fallout from Andriy Yermak's resignation in November 2025 was not just another political headline. It exposed a quieter competition over who shapes the end of the war, who decides the terms of security, and which interests gain access and influence when the war eventually winds down. It is a reminder that power has never been centralised in one place, and that competing interests are now shaping outcomes more openly than before. States still matter, but they no longer control the direction of conflict or the timing of peace alone. It shows how even in a major interstate war, control over outcomes is dispersed across political factions, private funders, foreign backers and societal forces.
      Power Beyond the State
      In Venezuela, tensions following the American strike has little to do with drugs, rhetoric or posturing alone. Politics matters, but so do the stakes beneath it: the largest proven oil reserves on earth, critical minerals and control of commercial advantage in a region where global competitors are increasingly active. This is the type of dispute where state power, private interests and informal networks blend into one another, and where none of these actors operate in isolation or according to national logic. It is a textbook case of a conflict shaped more by markets, resources and informal networks than by state intention.
      In the Middle East, Israel's simultaneous operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank show how modern warfare behaves when too many actors hold the capacity to escalate. Fronts no longer open and close; they bleed into one another, influenced not only by governments but by proxies, foreign backers and interests that do not wear national uniforms. The result is not confusion, it is complexity. Together, these overlapping fronts reinforce a world in which the power to escalate is no longer held by states alone.
      The Fracturing of Monopoly, Not the State
      These conflicts should not be lumped together, but they reveal a structural reality that they now share: the state is still powerful, but it is no longer the only force that matters. Too many actors now possess the means to shape violence, stall peace or influence outcomes from outside the traditional architecture of a government. The modern battlefield has matured into something closer to a marketplace of capabilities, incentives and interests than a domain controlled solely by states.
      Western strategic thinking has long struggled with this shift because its definitions of war remain narrow. Other traditions have always recognised a wider spectrum: the Russian military and strategic literature use the words borba ('struggle') to capture political, informational ...
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      20 min
    • Ukraine's Brigade level Commercial Approach

      Ukraine's Brigade level Commercial Approach
      Jan 9 2026
      The Russo-Ukrainian War is a crucible of modern military innovation and has seen adaptation at
      every echelon, which the British Army is seeking to learn lessons from. In particular, the
      emergence of brigade-level commercial contracting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has
      captured the imagination of its commanders. However, such an approach has inherent
      opportunities, risks and consequences. Ultimately, a Ukrainian brigade is not analogous to a British
      one and the Army has higher echelons of capable Division and Corps headquarters. Through a
      blended approach, these can serve to manage a system of 'decentralised' commerical contracting
      whilst mitigating the risks of tactical and institutional fragmentation. The British Army has to be
      discerning in which lessons it chooses to learn and adapt from.
      Over the course of Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and
      through the full-scale invasion in 2022, the AFU has "radically pivoted its approach to military
      innovation" and evolved a dual-track scheme to develop and procure military technologies. On the
      one hand, it operates a 'centralised' system orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and AFU
      command headquarters. This principally coordinates the flow of western-supplied equipment and
      seeks to manage sovereign industrial output. On the other, a 'decentralised' system has evolved
      with individual AFU brigades working directly with the commercial sector. By this latter approach,
      technology and equipment moves from factory to frontline at ever increasing speeds but this
      comes at the detriment of force standardisation and integration.
      This decentralised model of brigade-level procurement is attractive for those seeking to address
      criticisms of the MOD's "sluggish procurement processes". But the question is not whether to
      replicate the entire approach, which emerged from existential necessity to meet specific
      operational conditions, but rather to discern which elements might be adopted. The goal being to
      enhance MOD procurement without undermining the coherence that British industry and military
      requires. To do so it must understand the genesis of the AFU's brigade-level procurement model,
      consider the relative weight of opportunities vs risks and adapt them to Britain's own unique
      context.
      Origin Story
      The Ukrainian state in 2014 lacked sufficient funds to address its force's equipment deficits and
      regenerate units, which saw private citizens from across civil society fill the gap. This social
      phenomenon accelerated in February 2022 as numbers joining the AFU increased, with many of
      the new soldiers bringing significant personal wealth and business resource with them into service.
      Commerical enterprise and industrial companies became intertwined at the lowest tactical levels
      with frontline units. These in turn – which until recently were the largest AFU tactical formations –
      developed an entrepreneurial attitude to procurement.
      Thus emerged the 'decentralised' approach evident today. It grew organically to bypass traditional
      bureaucratic channels to enable speed of delivery and embed battlefield feedback into industrial
      procurement cycles. Critically, it also emerged in the absence of functional headquarters (for
      example Division and Corps) between the brigades and the AFU central command. The system
      was neither designed nor deliberate and as a result capacity varies across brigades. This is
      because of three fundamental tensions: tactical agility vs force standardisation; operational
      responsiveness vs industrial sustainability; and strategic mobilisation vs coherent force design.
      Tactical Agility vs Force Standardisation
      Brigade contracting has delivered a procurement cycle measured in days rather than months and
      years. Ukrainian forces can get drones, communications equipment and logistics enablement with
      unprecedented speed, allowing them to respond to Russian Forces in near-real time. CEPA noted
      the AFU's "response to the logistical challenges o...
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      13 min
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