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Everything Whatsoever

Everything Whatsoever

De : Clementine Ramsey and Solomon Osei
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Everything Whatsoever is a podcast in which we do close readings of individual philosophy papers—one paper per episode, in enough detail that you come away knowing what it argues and why it matters! To be clear up front, this show is largely AI-generated. However, every episode is reviewed, fact-checked, and edited by the human philosopher behind the show (that's me)!

More specifically, episodes usually run across a few parts, and the hosts—Solomon and Clementine, both synthetic voices—work through the paper's actual argument rather than a two-minute gloss. Scripts are generated and verified using frontier LLMs; a local TTS model handles production.

Why does this show exist? Here's what happened.

I'm a philosophy doctoral candidate who just submitted my PhD thesis, and I wanted a side project—something different and more creative than thesis work. Originally this wasn't a podcast; I just wanted audiobook versions of papers to listen to on the train, since I get distracted reading normally. Then the scope crept, and somewhere around v40 of a weekend project I looked up and had a podcast, a script-generation template, a mastering workflow, theme music, and two hosts with personalities.

If I stumbled on an "AI-generated podcast," I'd assume AI-slop. This isn't a content farm—I've spent a genuinely embarrassing amount of time trying to make this good and minimise the grating AI feel. The script generator enforces a fidelity contract, keeps a pronunciation registry for names, structures episodes pedagogically with roadmaps and re-entry summaries, and has actual rules about when the hosts are allowed to joke (the earlier drafts were tragic!). That said, there are far better, fully human philosophy podcasts out there—listen to and support them; I'm not trying to compete. This exists to fill gaps: papers with no proper episode, shows aimed at a different audience, or ones that are just boring.

On accuracy: I fact-check every script, but this is a side project meant to give you a feel for the paper you should then read carefully yourself! I try hard to avoid mistakes but guarantee nothing—treat this as a guide, never a sole source for anything that matters.

The first batch of episodes are pilots—far from perfect, and I'll keep improving them. Honestly, this is still basically for myself; I figured others might find it useful too, so I'm uploading it. It's taken far more time than intended, so if you get something out of it and want to keep the caffeine flowing (and me fine-tuning the show), I made a Ko-Fi:

https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast.

No expectation of tips—just throwing it out there :)

Reach out anytime—suggestions, corrections, fact-checks, recommendations, interesting thoughts, cat or dog pictures, or paper requests:

everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com

Podcasts you should also (mainly) listen to:

  1. Philosophy Bites

  2. In Our Time and Thinking Allowed (BBC Radio 4 — philosophy episodes)

  3. History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps

  4. Elucidations

  5. Overthink

  6. Philosophize This!

  7. The Partially Examined Life

  8. Philosophy Talk

  9. New Books in Philosophy

  10. The Dissenter

  11. Philosophy 247

  12. The Grey Area

  13. From Nowhere to Nothing

(There are also many others I cannot fit on this list!)

Everything Whatsoever 2026
Philosophie Science Sciences sociales
Épisodes
  • Miller, "Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?" — Part 1 of 3
    Oct 26 2026

    The cup on your desk at noon is, you'd say, the very same cup at one. Metaphysicians have two ways of making that true, and each draws a standing complaint: that nobody can say what it means for the cup to be "wholly present" at noon, or that the cup is really a series of shorter-lived objects that "come into and pass out of existence before our eyes." Kristie Miller takes up a third option that promises to dodge both: a worm stretched through time that is not built from segments. She asks whether it is a position worth holding.

    In Part 1, Solomon and Clementine start with the change Miller makes to Josh Parsons' title (must becomes ought), then lay out the four objections, two per side, that a worm without segments is meant to dodge; meet a spatially extended simple that is half orange and half purple yet has no halves, and the idea that a property can belong to a whole as a distribution; christen the third way of persisting, terdurance; watch the first option close when instantaneous simples hand back the perdurantist's ontology, either outright or with the segments merely relabelled as not-parts; define a terduring simple, which is where Clementine presses two questions: what is actually sitting at a "slice" of space-time, and whether the whole view is just endurantism with the identity crossed out; and pin down, with five clauses and a candle burning from noon to one, the rich perdurantist thesis that terdurantists deny. Part 1 ends at the word the whole view hangs on: what "part" can mean for a worm with no segments, and the two ways of giving it a time that Miller tries next.

    No prior metaphysics of persistence needed; we build every piece from the ground up.

    This is a close reading across three parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: Kristie Miller, "Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 4 (December 2009), pp. 619–646 — via its DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0062

    [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.]

    New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show — see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself).

    Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com

    Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast

    Afficher plus Afficher moins
    26 min
  • Everything Whatsoever: Quine "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — pt2
    Aug 14 2026

    Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — Part 2 of 2

    Part 1 left the machine in pieces: five shapes pooled into one region, and the moral that the smallest word we have has been leading a double life. Part 2 is where Quine tells you what the second life costs, and the answer is three letters. Not a doctrine, not an argument—a suffix. Add "-ness" to a perfectly innocent adjective and you have just admitted an abstract entity into your ontology, and nobody will stop you, because the grammar does it silently!

    In Part 2, Solomon and Clementine work out the bill. Why the ostension of square differs from the ostension of the Cayster by exactly one word—whether identity is imputed across the pointings — and why that one word is the whole difference; how the general term goes deflationary, so that pointing teaches a skill rather than acquainting you with an entity, and "is square" need name nothing at all; Frege's toll-booth, a criterion for when a term is naming (will it go into an identity context and obey the law of putting equals for equals?), and how it welds Quine's two contrasts into one contrast seen twice; then the operator itself—"class of" and "-ness", one move in two notations—and Quine's shrug at the difference between an attribute and a class, which turns out to be a signpost rather than a shrug. Commitment lives in the noun, not the adjective. Then the conjecture: that abstract entities got their hold on our imaginations through nobody noticing this distinction in the first place.

    Then the verdict, and the three things Clementine has been carrying in pencil since Part 1. The blank check on natural groupings—left standing, and traced forward to Goodman, to entrenchment, and to grue. Discourse-relativity—paid in full by section five's pragmatic standard, just a section later than promised. And Hume's ghost, where the hosts genuinely disagree and end split rather than convinced.

    Start with Part 1 — this half runs straight on from the cliff, and we rebuild the room at the top but we do not reassemble the machine.

    This is a close reading across two parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: W. V. Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," Journal of Philosophy 47, no. 22 (October 26, 1950), pp. 621–633 — also reprinted, lightly reworked, as chapter IV of From a Logical Point of View (1953), pp. 65–79.

    [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.]

    New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show — see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself).

    Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com

    Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast

    Afficher plus Afficher moins
    27 min
  • Everything Whatsoever: Quine "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — pt1
    Jul 25 2026

    Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — Part 1 of 2

    Every undergraduate is told you cannot bathe in the same river twice, and nobody has ever quite believed it. Quine agrees that you can—flatly, you can—and then spends thirteen pages working out precisely what it costs to say that this is so! The cost of this is a machine: take some acts of pointing, add an identity claim, and objects come out the other end. The machine builds a river. Then it builds the colour red. Then it is asked to build the shapes square and triangle, and something goes badly wrong.

    In Part 1, Solomon and Clementine assemble the machine and watch it break. Heracleitus dissolved in two sentences; river-stages and water-stages, and how you may bathe in the same water twice while bathing in two different rivers; why pointing on its own fixes almost nothing until identity is imputed across the gestures, and what the paper quietly borrows to make the induction work; Hume's ghost, invited in and never quite shown out; the maxim of the identification of indiscernibles, which demotes Leibniz from legislator to management consultant; and then the nominalist's Christmas morning, where redness dissolves into red, the largest red thing there is, and the inventory stays entirely concrete. Then Quine draws the only figure in the paper — a square, both diagonals, both midlines, thirty-three regions, five shapes — and the whole beautiful construction collapses into a single object. Part 1 ends at the wound: "this is the Cayster" and "this is square" were never the same is.

    No prior Quine needed; we build every piece from the ground up.

    There's also a short primer episode for this paper (Ep. 04), released just before this one—the universals debate as it actually stood at mid-century and what it costs to stand on the nominalist side of it, why explanation by pointing was a foundational question rather than a parlour trick, and where Quine himself was standing in 1950, which is a stranger place than his reputation suggests. It's background rather than paper; if you already hold that ground, skip it with our blessing.

    This is a close reading across two parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: W. V. Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," Journal of Philosophy 47, no. 22 (October 26, 1950), pp. 621–633 — also reprinted, lightly reworked, as chapter IV of From a Logical Point of View (1953), pp. 65–79.

    [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.]

    New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show — see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself).

    Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com

    Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast

    Afficher plus Afficher moins
    35 min
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