At Black Hat USA 2026, Microsoft’s David Weston put three numbers on a slide that anyone still running domain controllers should sit with. The Microsoft Security Response Center went from 80 patches in February to 1,142 at the July Patch Tuesday. The fastest observed breakout time dropped from 98 minutes to 27 seconds. And mean time-to-exploit flipped from 63 days after a patch shipped to seven days before the patch existed.Tarek Dawoud, Lead Architect on the Technical Excellence Team in Microsoft Security, walks Merill through those slides and then draws the conclusion for identity teams in his own words: “Active Directory is like 10x harder to defend than Entra.” If you do not already have a plan to move off AD, he says, sit down and write one.He also says how Microsoft handles this itself. Most of Microsoft’s own servers run in the cloud, its front ends run with no domain at all, and on-prem AD survives mainly as a dial-tone service: the thing they need to bring Azure up from scratch, and not much else.Tarek is back on Entra.Chat, and he was privy to a small part of Project Glasswing, where Microsoft got early access to Anthropic’s Mythos-class models to find vulnerabilities in its own products before attackers could. The red-team community was cynical at the time; what Microsoft saw internally was, in his words, “very concerning. Those things were damn good.” From there he builds Weston’s argument: the whole security industry rests on an assumption of scarcity. Vulnerabilities are rare, exploits are expensive, and attackers have recognisable tactics, techniques and procedures. Patch-and-pray works when bugs arrive slowly. TTP-based detection works when a human crew reuses its playbook. When a risk is small, driving it smaller is worth the money; as Tarek puts it, “if something has a 95% possibility of happening, pushing it down to 80% doesn’t change anymore.” The Hugging Face intrusion (an OpenAI agent, and not a deliberate attack, as Merill is quick to note) showed what happens when the old assumptions fail: the agent landed on one server and looped, try an exploit, fail, write a new tool, try again, with no attempt to hide and no signature to match. Hugging Face survived by repeatedly tearing down and rebuilding core infrastructure. Tarek’s question for listeners: “Does your AD team have that skill?” Tearing down and rebuilding domain controllers, he notes, is not a thirty-minute operation.Hence the pitch: “Where you don’t need to own infrastructure, you shouldn’t manage infrastructure.” Tarek is explicit that this is his read of the moment rather than a mandate, and that it does not apply everywhere. Disconnected environments, military and intelligence, some manufacturing and IoT, and shielded OT networks such as utilities and remote mine sites are carved out; nobody is going to win the argument to punch a hole in an isolated OT environment to reach Entra. But for the ordinary case, collaboration, email, SharePoint, file shares, and apps that already live in Azure or AWS or even on-premises, he calls running your own identity infrastructure a losing battle. The minimum step is a strategy memo for your board that says what you are facing and why identity infrastructure investment needs to shrink.Merill raises the two objections he hears most. First: you are just trusting Microsoft, and Entra ID has bugs too. Tarek’s answer is about who is on the hook. Microsoft owns and patches the Entra infrastructure; the service deploys roughly every 10 business days and can push a critical hotfix worldwide within a day or two, across a fleet that was already more than 100,000 compute nodes five years ago. You still have to handle Entra bugs, but the work looks like a Conditional Access policy to block a risky flow such as device code flow, not patching every server yourself. One customer he worked with had about 12 people in IAM for more than 200,000 employees; Entra has over 2,000. Second: this is licensing revenue and cloud stickiness dressed up as security. Tarek does not pretend to know the CAL math. “Assuming good intentions,” he says, the case is defensibility: the ports, the legacy protocols, the sheer number of things to watch, and the amount of legacy that is indefensible. That is where the “10x” line comes from: an architect’s rough comparison, not a measurement.The back half is the path, using the Road to the cloud model at aka.ms/ad2entra. Map yourself to one of five states first: cloud attached, hybrid, cloud-first, AD minimized, cloud only. Then the moves that matter most. Decide, as a business, to stop buying apps that only run on-prem and make OAuth or SAML support a checkbox in the security review, because you will never turn off AD while a single LDAP app remains. Move devices to cloud management and out of hybrid join. Do not extend your domain into the cloud to manage servers; every cloud can patch and maintain a server without one, Microsoft...
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