Épisodes

  • 018 - Chapter 11 War or Peace Political and Economic Factors

    018 - Chapter 11 War or Peace Political and Economic Factors
    Jan 18 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    22 min
  • 017 - Chapter 10 Possible Features of a War in the Pacific

    017 - Chapter 10 Possible Features of a War in the Pacific
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    51 min
  • 016 - Chapter 9b Strategy in the Pacific Part Two

    016 - Chapter 9b Strategy in the Pacific Part Two
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    40 min
  • 015 - Chapter 9a Strategy in the Pacific Part One

    015 - Chapter 9a Strategy in the Pacific Part One
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    29 min
  • 014 - Chapter 8 Japanese Sea-Power Torpedo-Craft Submarines and Aircraft

    014 - Chapter 8 Japanese Sea-Power Torpedo-Craft Submarines and Aircraft
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    51 min
  • 013 - Chapter 7b Japanese Sea-Power Its Men and Ships Part Two

    013 - Chapter 7b Japanese Sea-Power Its Men and Ships Part Two
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    46 min
  • 012 - Chapter 7a Japanese Sea-Power Its Men and Ships Part One

    012 - Chapter 7a Japanese Sea-Power Its Men and Ships Part One
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    30 min
  • 011 - Chapter 6 Japanese Sea-Power Administration Dockyards and Shipbuilding Resources

    011 - Chapter 6 Japanese Sea-Power Administration Dockyards and Shipbuilding Resources
    Jan 17 2026
    In the three decades leading up to the Pacific War, the United States dedicated significant effort to envisioning what a conflict with Japan might entail. However, the reality of the Pacific War diverged sharply from these meticulously crafted plans, particularly War Plan Orange. Both American and Japanese strategies were heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahans theories on sea power and decisive battles, despite the absence of such climactic naval confrontations in the Great War. The Pacific War further strayed from the Naval War Colleges expectations, as battleships were quickly overshadowed by aircraft carriers. Initially driven by necessity, the evolving capabilities of planes and the refinement of carrier doctrine soon illuminated the carriers dominance in shaping naval engagements. Hector Charles Bywaters Sea-Power in the Pacific, published in 1921, along with his 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, surprisingly predicts aspects of the conflict more accurately than many interwar naval strategies. While the extent of their influence in the United States remains uncertain, journalist William H. Honan noted in a 1970 article that both works were translated into Japanese and circulated among naval officers during this crucial time. The cover features Yamashita Gentarō, then chief of the Navy General Staff, who was part of the Fleet Faction opposing the contentious Washington Naval Treaty. This faction played a pivotal role in the Navy General Staffs swift translation and distribution of Bywaters book upon its release. Although the precise impact of Sea-Power in the Pacific on Japanese military thought is unclear, it undeniably influenced the political dynamics within the Imperial Navy throughout the 1920s. - Summary by Alister
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    38 min