Influence Pays – Game Theory for Smarter Workplace Incentives | with Pau Milán
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Influence Pays – Game Theory for Smarter Workplace Incentives | with Pau Milán
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In this episode, we explore how game theory and network effects intersect to inform optimal incentive structures in organizations. Pau Milán walks us through his recent research, co-authored with Nicolás Oviedo-Davila and Marc Claveria, which uses a novel game-theoretic model to show how the productivity of one employee can amplify the output of others in their network—and how firms can leverage this to design smarter compensation schemes. Drawing on real-world examples and his theoretical work, Pau offers practical insights for employers and economists alike.
Pau Milán is an Associate Professor of Economics at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) and an Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona School of Economics (BSE). His research interests include Social and Economic Networks, Information Economics, Development Economics, Organisations, and Applied Game Theory. You can find the working paper "Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace" here.