Is the West past the tipping point for civil conflict? In this episode of Hunter’s War, we sit down with Professor David Betz of King's College London for a challenging conversation about political legitimacy, insurgency, and the fragility of modern Western societies.

We explore the core concepts of insurgency as a social movement and why modern counterinsurgency often fails. Applying these lessons home, we discuss the indicators of domestic civil war currently flashing red in the West: polar factionalism, the fear of status loss, and the total collapse of institutional legitimacy. We also examine why economic wealth and elite overproduction contribute to the expectation gap and what strategies might exist to mitigate the fallout of internal conflict.

Referenced essays by Professor Betz:

Civil War Comes to the West: https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/civil-war-comes-to-the-west/

Civil War Comes to the West Part II: https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/civil-war-comes-to-the-west-part-ii-strategic-realities/

Professor David Betz is a Professor of War in the Modern World at King's College London, where he has taught in the Department of War Studies for over 20 years. His research focuses on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the changing character of war.

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This week, I’m joined by Michelle Haas, a PhD researcher at the University of Ghent focusing on NATO and European defense policy. She is also a fellow at the Egmont Institute, a board member of the Royal Higher Institute for Defense, and an active reservist in the Special Forces.For Dutch speakers, I highly recommend her podcast, de Paniekzaaiers: https://open.spotify.com/show/133zoy8FpiOehF5WA47KLy?si=80af5952da0e4addThe episodes with Jan Balliauw on Russia and, before that, discussing the US potential withdrawal from Europe are great. In this episode, we discuss the precarious state of the transatlantic security relationship, the lessons Europe can learn from the Nordic and Baltic states about societal resilience, and the critical lack of strategic communication from political leaders about evolving threats.The Transatlantic AllianceOur conversation started with the transatlantic security relationship, the cornerstone of European defense for the last century. Michelle argues that while the alliance is not dead, it is under "immense pressure". She believes the possibility of a US withdrawal of troops from Europe is "very likely" and that Europe is simply not prepared for.A sudden, unpredictable withdrawal would be a "shock to Europe" and could cause a "serious break" in the relationship. This isn't a new development; the US has been signaling its pivot to Asia for 10-15. However, Europe's strategic disunity, stemming from different threat perceptions among member states, has prevented it from developing genuine strategic autonomy.Lessons from the Nordics & BalticsWe then turned to the Nordic and Baltic countries to learn lessons from their defense approaches. Michelle notes that these countries have greater "strategic clarity" regarding the Russian threat. For them, the war didn't begin in 2022 but in 2014, and there is a sense of frustration with Western Europe's delayed reaction. Key aspects of their approach include:Total Defense: They embrace a "whole of society" approach, understanding that defense is more than just a military matter and that the entire population must be included and prepared. Finland is a prime example, with hundreds of thousands of reservists and an extensive civil defense infrastructure.Societal Resilience: The goal is to build a society that can withstand disruption. This includes practical measures like ensuring the population can take care of itself for at least 72 hours in a crisis, a standard that should apply across Europe.Deterrence by Punishment: Estonia, for example, is investing in long-range missiles to demonstrate an ability to strike back at Russia, shifting from a strategy of deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment.The Strategic Communication GapA major theme of our discussion was the failure of strategic communication. There is a "disconnect" between political leaders and the public, who often don't understand what threats they are preparing for or why massive defense investments are needed.Michelle argues that political messaging in Western Europe is often alarmist ("we are not prepared," "we have zero stocks"), which is counterproductive. The Nordic and Baltic approach is more constructive and empowering: "we are prepared and we are preparing and everyone can take a part in this". She points to recent examples of Belgian politicians calling increased defense spending a "social bloodbath" and creating "collective hysteria," which only serves to increase the polarization our adversaries want to achieve. The goal should be to balance realism with an optimistic story that gives people a sense of agency, rather than creating fear.Photo by Thomas Nolf.

In this conversation, Hunter interviews Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, about his book 'From Jihad to Politics,' which explores the transformation of Syrian jihadi organizations into political entities. Drevon discusses the complexities of the Syrian Civil War, the evolution of groups like HTS and Ahrar Al-Sham, and the importance of understanding these organizations within their social and political contexts. He emphasizes the significance of field research and the need for a nuanced approach to studying insurgent groups, highlighting the challenges they face in balancing radical ideologies with the demands of governance and political legitimacy.

His book is available for purchase (if you can, support the research this way!): https://a.co/d/eBBZaJz (Amazon) or

Or publicly via the PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382491710_From_Jihad_to_Politics_How_Syrian_Jihadis_Embraced_Politics

Order Jerome’s new book “ Transformed by the People” : https://a.co/d/0xYkWih

Keywords: Syria, Jihad, Politics, HTS, Ahrar Al-Sham, Al-Qaeda, Institutionalization, Field Research, Jihadi Organizations, Middle East

Notes from the discussion:

Jerome shares his surprise at the speed of the HTS-led offensive that led to the collapse of the Assad regime. While he and his colleagues had observed significant transformations within HTS in Northwest Syria, the swiftness of their victory was unexpected even for the group itself. The international community had largely ignored the evolving situation in Syria, making the outcome all the more shocking.

Hunter asks why Jerome focused on Ahrar Al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra (which became HTS) out of the hundreds of groups in the Syrian conflict. Jerome explains that unlike ISIS, which he found less interesting due to its reliance on "violence for the sake of it," these two groups had to adapt their radical ideas to survive. Their evolution and willingness to learn from their environment presented a more complex and compelling case study.

A key concept from Jerome's book is institutionalization, which he breaks down into internal and external dimensions.

• Internal Institutionalization: This refers to how a group organizes itself beyond its initial leaders, creating structures for recruitment, decision-making, and providing basic services. This allows a group to survive the loss of key figures.

• External Institutionalization: This involves how a group coordinates with other armed factions, governs civilian populations, and interacts with foreign states.

Jerome argues that this process of institutionalization, rather than simple centralization, constrains a group and forces it to make concessions, a step ISIS was never willing to take.

Jerome prefers the term "politicization" over "moderation" to describe the transformation of groups like HTS. He argues that "moderate" is a subjective term, and these groups were still committed to violence. Instead, they became more political by recognizing that military action is a means to a political end, not the end itself. This involves making alliances, dealing with foreign states, and making concessions to the local population.

Jerome explains the "jihadi paradox": the very factors that make transnational jihadi groups successful (like their global networks and clear ideology) also prevent them from achieving ultimate political victory. Their transnational nature inevitably draws international opposition. Groups like the Taliban and HTS understood that to win, they had to distance themselves from transnational jihad and focus on becoming national governing bodies.

Hunter asks about Jerome's personal experience interviewing the now-interim president of Syria. Jerome describes al-Sharaa as a decisive commander and leader who commands respect, rather than a deep intellectual thinker. He notes that al-Sharaa was willing to learn and adapt, representing a younger generation poised to do things differently in Syria