Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection.

Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly.

In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions.

Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?

A debate exists between a braita and Rav regarding communal peace offerings brought on Shavuot for the sake of rams instead of sheep; the braita deems the sacrifice ineffective, while Rav holds it is. Rav Chisda and Raba disagree on the specific nature of this case. Their dispute centers on whether the laws of "intent for the wrong sacrifice" apply when a kohen mistakenly misidentifies the animal's original purpose.

Two objections, one from Mishna Gittin 54a and one from a braita, are raised against Raba's position that a sacrifice offered for the wrong purpose by mistake remains valid. In both instances, the Gemara resolves the objections.

The Mishna explains that the daily tamid and the special mussaf sacrifices of Shabbat and festivals do not preclude one another. However, the precise meaning of the Mishna is initially unclear.

The Gemara introduces a question posed by Rabbi Chiya bar Avin to Rav Chisda: if only one animal is available, should it be used for today's mussaf or saved for tomorrow's tamid?

Initially, our Mishna is cited to prove that there is no specific preference between the two, but this proof is rejected as inconclusive. A different source is brought to resolve the question, but it is also dismissed, as the Gemara determines it refers to a case irrelevant to the current discussion.