Cover of CISSP Cyber Training Podcast - CISSP Training Program

CISSP Cyber Training Podcast - CISSP Training Program

CISSP Cyber Training Podcast - CISSP Training Program

By: Shon Gerber vCISO CISSP Cybersecurity Consultant and Entrepreneur
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Summary

Join Shon Gerber on his weekly CISSP Cyber Training podcast, where his extensive 23-year background in cybersecurity shines through. With a rich history spanning corporate sectors, government roles, and academic positions, Shon imparts the essential insights and advice necessary to conquer the CISSP exam. His expertise is not just theoretical; as a CISSP credential holder since 2009, Shon translates his deep understanding into actionable training. Each episode is packed with invaluable security strategies and tips that you can implement right away, giving you an edge in the cybersecurity realm. Tune in and take the reins of your cybersecurity journey—let’s ride into excellence together! 🚀

© 2026 CISSP Cyber Training Podcast - CISSP Training Program
Episodes
  • CCT 379: Five Agencies, One Freezer, And A Controller Nobody Owned (Domain 4)
    16 Nov 2026
    Send us Fan MailCISSP Domain 4.1 — apply secure design principles in network architectures, built on a joint federal warning about internet-reachable refrigeration controllers.Start free: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/free-cissp-self-study (360 practice questions, a Domain 1 diagnostic, and weekly questions by email)In early November, five US federal agencies put their names on one joint fact sheet. CISA, the FBI, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and the Department of Transportation. Four sectors named: Healthcare and Public Health, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation Systems.And what they are warning about is the box that keeps the freezer cold at your grocery storeWHAT THE DOCUMENT SAYSActors are targeting electronic temperature controllers and commercial refrigeration controllers — the ones in retail grocery stores and cold storage facilities. Three ways in, and the agencies name all three: authentication bypass, arbitrary code injection, and weak configurations.Once they are in, they can remotely alter settings and force those units into continuous heating and defrost cycles.The agencies list what that could do. It could affect the service life of the system. It could create a fire hazard. It could cause loss of inventory. And it could indirectly harm consumers, if products are consumed after they were stored at an unsafe temperature.A freezer, run backwards, is a fire hazard and a public health problem.THE SECOND EFFECT, AND THE BEST PHRASE IN THE DOCUMENTThere is one more consequence on their list: loss of visibility into current temperatures. Their phrase for it is a denial-of-view condition.Think about what that means. The actors do not have to change a single setting. They only have to take away your ability to see. And now the temperature log — the compliance record, the thing you would hand an inspector — is reporting a number that is not true, or is not reporting at all.You cannot manage what you cannot observe, and an attacker who understands that does not need to break anything.WHAT THE DOCUMENT IS NOTThis is a warning, not a breach report. There is no victim, no company, no country, no count, and no date of an incident, because the document is not about one event. The verb throughout is "could" — the agencies are describing capability, not casualties.Press coverage of this fact sheet carries figures the government document does not: store counts, countries, temperatures. None of them are asserted in this episode. If you want them, they belong to the outlets that published them.WHY THESE CONTROLLERS ARE CONNECTED AT ALLThe device is not a toy. The fact sheet lists exactly what it is for: automated and remote monitoring of temperatures, continuous temperature logging, defrost cycle management, and energy optimization. Four jobs, and every one of them is a business function. The logging is a compliance record. The defrost management keeps the coils from icing over. The energy optimization is somebody's utility bill.Look at the first one again. REMOTE monitoring. That is not laziness. If you are running a lot of stores, you are not sending a person around to read a thermometer. Remote monitoring is the entire reason the thing was bought.So it got connected. And the question nobody asked at the time was: connected to what?Now look at the three vectors again. Authentication bypass. Arbitrary code injection. Weak configurations. Not one of them is exotic. They are the three oldest doors in the building, and they work here because this class of device spent twenty years being designed for a network nobody outside the building could reach.WHY THIS IS A DOMAIN 4.1 EPISODEEight mitigations on the agencies' list. The first two are not about the device at all.Number one: do not expose control system devices — and they call out controller panels specifically — to the internet. If remote access is necessary, protect it with a firewall or an edge device and keep that updated.Number two: create a dedicated OT virtual local area network, an OT VLAN, to separate those devices from the business network.Neither of those is a patch and neither one is a product. They are design decisions, and somebody made them, or didn't make them, probably years ago.THE MANAGER'S TAKEAWAYAsk who owns that controller.Here is how it usually goes. Facilities bought it. A vendor installed it. The vendor needed remote access to support it, so somebody in IT opened a path, and it was a Tuesday and it worked. It is not in the asset inventory. It has never been in a vulnerability scan scope. And it has an address somebody can reach from the other side of the world.Reachable is a design decision. It is not an accident. The only real question is whether the person who made it was in security.IN THE TRAINING BLOCK• What 4.1 actually asks: physical, logical and micro-segmentation in ISC2's own wording; edge networks; traffic flows, north-south and east-west. Domain 4 is 13% of the exam.• Why ...
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    43 min
  • CCT 378: Two Feeds, Full Backup, And The Generators Never Started (Domain 3)
    9 Nov 2026
    Send us Fan MailCISSP Domain 3.9 — design site and facility security controls, built on a real data center power failure where every control in the building worked and the building still went dark.Start free: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/free-cissp-self-study (360 practice questions, a Domain 1 diagnostic, weekly questions by email, and the slides from this episode)In October, a cloud provider's London data center lost its utility power. The batteries picked up the load exactly the way they were supposed to, ran for about five minutes, and then ran out. The generators should have taken over in that window. They never got the signal.Nobody attacked anybody here. There are no bad guys in this one. No ransomware, no intrusion, nothing for incident response to chase. It was a cable fault outside the building and a logic error inside it.HOW THE BUILDING WAS BUILTStart with the design, because the design was good. Two completely independent utility feeds coming in from the power company — they call them A and B. Google's own words for that are a 2N utility power architecture.Now listen to where that label stops. Behind both of those feeds sits one central bank of high-voltage generators, run by a dual-redundant controller, a PLC. Two of the thing coming in. One of the thing that was supposed to save them. And between the utility going away and the generators coming up, a battery system with about five minutes of runtime. That isn't a lot and it isn't supposed to be. It's a bridge.So when somebody tells you a site is 2N, the only honest follow-up is: 2N at which layer?Five days before any of this, they ran a quarterly load test on the generators. A real test, under load. And that test found a problem. So they did the right thing — they scheduled the repair. But to do the repair they had to physically open the breaker on feed B and lock it out, which they did properly: keyed interlock, locked out, tagged out.And that is the moment the building stopped being 2N on the utility side. For several days — Google doesn't publish exactly how many — that site ran on one utility feed. Google's own words for it are a temporary single-feed, 1N, bridged maintenance posture.Then the cable broke. An underground cable out on the utility network, outside the building entirely, developed a fault. And it was on feed A. The only feed that was live.WHY THE GENERATORS NEVER STARTEDThe PLC decides when to start the generators, and it decides it by sensing voltage. If the voltage goes away, start the generators. Simple enough.But those voltage sensors were wired upstream of the feed breakers. On the line side. And feed B — the one that was open for repairs — was still energized upstream, all the way up to that open breaker. The power company was still feeding it. It just wasn't connected to the building anymore.So the PLC looks at its sensor, sees voltage on feed B, concludes that a healthy utility source is available, and never issues a start command.Google's own root cause is this: a misconfiguration of the PLC logic that did not verify both an undervoltage condition and physical breaker position for both utility feeders. It checked whether there was voltage. It never checked whether that voltage was actually connected to anything.And here's the part worth a line in your notes. That PLC was dual-redundant. There were two of them. Both of them were wrong in exactly the same way, because they shared a configuration. Duplicating the box does not duplicate the judgment. That's common-mode failure, and it is the reason a redundancy count is not a resilience measurement.Five minutes later the batteries were done and the data halls went dark.TWO NUMBERS, KEPT APARTAbout ninety minutes with the data halls unpowered. Six hours and eight minutes before the services on top of them were whole again. Both figures are in Google's report and they measure different things. According to The Register, the companies caught in that window included Lloyds, HSBC, Royal Mail and Revolut — Google published no customer list and no customer count.To their credit, Google published the whole thing: the timeline, the wiring, the root cause, and a list of fixes with dates on them. One of those action items is the most honest line in the document. They committed to making PLC code review part of facility commissioning — which tells you it wasn't.THE MANAGER'S TAKEAWAYTwo things, and neither one is "test your generators."They DID test. The quarterly load test is what found the fault in the first place. What nobody did was look at the consequence: fixing that fault meant opening a breaker, and opening that breaker meant the building ran on one feed for days. As far as anybody treated it, that was a maintenance ticket. It wasn't a changed risk posture.And the second one, the one to carry into the exam room: an automatic control is only as good as the thing it can sense. The generator was perfect. The battery was perfect. The logic was asking...
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    43 min
  • CCT 377: 155 Answers, Nobody Broke In, And The Control Nobody Named (Domain 2)
    2 Nov 2026
    Send us Fan MailCISSP Domain 2.6 — data security controls, compliance requirements, and the three states of data, built on an AI hosting exposure that encryption could never have reached, because the data was exposed while it was being used.Start free: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/free-cissp-self-study (360 practice questions, a Domain 1 diagnostic, weekly questions by email, and the slides from this episode)One hundred and fifty-five answers went to the wrong people. Nobody broke in.In late August, Cloudflare launched the GLM-5.3 model on Workers AI. The model advertised a context window of just over one million tokens. The memory pool behind it — the prefill KV cache — held about six hundred and eighty thousand. The pool was smaller than the thing it was advertised to hold.Picture a shared workbench with a scratch pad on it. You sit down, you do your working-out, you get up and leave. In a well-run shop somebody wipes that pad before the next person sits down. That pad is memory, and wiping it is the control.When a request came in too big for the pad, the system marked it rejected, which was correct, and then passed the pad downstream anyway. The next stage read it, found the previous request's working still on it, and handed that back as a successful answer. Not an error. An HTTP 200.155 responses were affected, every one from a prompt over the pool's limit. Cloudflare said only that a small number of customers were involved and published no customer count. It found no evidence of deliberate exploitation. This was an exposure — nothing was taken, nobody broke in — and the misconfigured value and the serving-engine behavior both sat in the hosting stack, not with the model's maker. The advertised context length itself was accurate.Security researcher Gadi Evron of Knostic reported it through HackerOne. Cloudflare began verifying it the next morning and reproduced it from two independent accounts within twenty-five minutes of declaring the incident — and the model was offline about fifteen hours after the report landed. Root cause thirty-five minutes later, corrected configuration seventeen minutes after that. It raised the pool to roughly twice the advertised window, moved retirement of rejected requests to the admission queue before any cache transfer, added a deployment check comparing pool size to context length, and published the whole timeline itself.Now the part that turns it into exam content. Encryption at rest and encryption in transit were never going to touch this one. Not because anything was wrong with them. Because neither one has a single thing to say about data while it is being used.And they knew. Cloudflare knew before launch that the two numbers disagreed. It assumed the engine would handle it cleanly, and what it validated was the status code and the performance — not the answer coming back. The engine said 200 OK, so it looked fine. It was not a secret. It was an assumption nobody had validated, standing in for a control nobody owned.A control is not a control because of what it is called. It is a control because of what fails when it is wrong.In this episode:• The three states of data — at rest, in transit, in use — and why the third is the one you get tested on. At rest and in transit are cryptography questions. In use is an isolation question, and cryptography alone does not reach it. Confidential computing is the exception.• The data-in-use control vocabulary: memory isolation, zeroization between requests, object reuse controls, confidential computing, homomorphic encryption and admission control. Object reuse is the classic ISC2 phrasing for this failure shape.• Scoping and tailoring, and the precision trap. Scoping is not a step before tailoring — it is one of the six tailoring actions NIST SP 800-53B names, and an option that sequences them is the distractor.• Standards selection and baselines: ISO 27001, NIST SP 800-53 and 53B, CSF 2.0, CIS, the Cloud Controls Matrix, PCI DSS and SOC 2, taught by differentiator rather than contents. A baseline is a floor, not a fit.• Data protection methods — DRM, DLP, CASB, tokenization and masking — and why not one of them would have caught this. Every one reads a content flow.• Multi-tenancy and shared responsibility, and the control each side assumed the other already owned.• The crossover, named out loud: "should we accept this?" is Domain 1. "How is it enforced?" is Domain 3. "What does this data require?" is 2.6, and that is this episode.• Four CISSP practice questions and the trap inside each one. Question two is the one that gets people.The line to carry into the exam room: Domain 2.6 does not ask you to list encryption types. It asks which controls this data, in this state, in this environment actually requires — and then whether anybody owns them as requirements.LINKSFree CISSP Essentials:https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/free-cissp-self-studyAll episodes and the written ...
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    43 min
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